According to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), states have to provide indicators in order to assess the performance of their initiatives for halting the loss of biodiversity. Sixteen headline indicators have been identified for monitoring the CBD targets. Of these indicators only one, "Trends in the abundance and distribution of selected species," is a direct headline indicator of "non-exploited" biodiversity. In France, the implementation of this indicator is completely dependent on data collected by volunteers. Since this investment of volunteer time is equivalent to savings in administrative costs, we attempt in this paper to assign it a monetary value. This enables us to estimate how much the French administration saves thanks to volunteer efforts and how much public funding would have to be invested if volunteers were no longer willing to participate in these biodiversity monitoring schemes. We estimate this amount to be between 678,523 and 4,415,251 euros per year, depending on the scenario selected.
Introduction: Biodiversity Indicators and Volunteers in Monitoring Schemes
The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) has identified goals for the halting of biodiversity loss by 2010 (CBD, 1992) . To ensure that this commitment is followed through, the efforts undertaken by each country need to be tracked and measured (Dobson, 2005) . For this purpose the first CBD indicators were established in February 2004, at the seventh Conference of the Parties to the Convention which took place in Kuala Lumpur (http://www.biodiv.org). Every EU member state has to fulfil the EU commitment to document headline indicators of biodiversity.
In Europe the implementation of the CBD has been outlined by the SEBI (Streamlining European 2010 Biodiversity Indicators) initiative "Halting the loss of biodiversity by 2010: proposal for a first set of indicators to monitor progress in Europe" (European Environment Agency, 2007 Green et al., 2005) . The goal of this group of experts was to identify which of the proposed indicators could be implemented in the short term, under what conditions Levrel, 2007) . The first headline indicators in their list, out of a total of 16 (Table 1) , rely entirely on the availability of monitoring data for documenting the abundance and distribution of selected species of birds and butterflies.
This headline indicator is especially important for the CBD targets. When we review the CBD indicators in detail, we can see that only three of them can be considered "direct" core biodiversity indicators -"abundance and diversity of groups of species" , the "Red List Index" (RLI) (Butchart et al., 2005) , and the "Marine Trophic Index" (MTI) (Pauly and Watson, 2005) . Others represent pressures on biodiversity or social responses to biodiversity loss Levrel et al., 2009) . The RLI provides only qualitative information on the conservation status of species and does not detect short-term changes (Balmford et al., 2003) , and the MTI is criticized because it is based only on commercial fish catches, not on a random scientific sampling (e.g., de Mutsert et al., 2008) .
The fact that the headline indicator relies on the work of volunteers is not surprising. Data sets on biodiversity are usually developed by volunteer naturalists who collect information in their spare time (Schmeller et al., 2009; Bell et al., 2008; Julliard et al., 2004; Thomas, 2005; Cooper et al., 2007; Gregory et al., 2005; van Swaay et al., 2008) . In France, for example, only 28.3% of biodiversity monitoring schemes (n = 93) are run by professional paid staff (Schmeller et al., 2009) .
The substantial dependence of existing biodiversity monitoring schemes on local volunteers' availability is potentially a critical weakness of biodiversity monitoring strategies around the world. For instance, it means that attractive taxonomic groups receive by far the greatest attention, and that virtually no large-scale monitoring is in place in non-OECD countries (Balmford et al., 2003 Henry et al., 2008; Fontaine et al., 2007) . On the other hand, the participation of Ecological Economics 69 (2010 ) 1580 -1586 local stakeholders in the development of monitoring schemes is a good way to improve the public's knowledge of biodiversity (Cooper et al., 2007) , to launch collective learning-by-doing processes (Levrel and Bouamrane, 2008; Stringer et al., 2006) , to support public debates, and of course to effect savings in the public costs of biodiversity monitoring (Schmeller et al., 2009; Couvet et al., 2008) .
The purpose of the present paper is to address this last pointsavings in public costs -and to make explicit the economic contribution of volunteer labor to the production of biodiversity indicators, using a French example. It is intended to demonstrate to policymakers how much is saved by the French government department responsible for providing biodiversity indicators for monitoring progress towards the 2010 CBD targets, thanks to the commitment of volunteers in France.
Methods
According to the economics literature, there are several methods for valuing the "shadow wages" of the volunteer workforce (Brown, 1999; Steinberg, 1990) . These fall into two types (Prouteau and Wolff, 2004) , the output-related and the input-related methods.
The output-related method is based on volunteers' contribution to the revenue (VCR) of an organization. Under this method, the value of volunteer work is equal to the value of the additional output produced by the work in question (Foster et al., 2001) . The valuation process requires collecting information about five parameters: input quantity (volunteer effort), output quantity (production), output prices, revenues, and the links between them. Theoretically, the VCR is the soundest method for producing a volunteer effort valuation, because "it varies with the degree of substitution between volunteers and paid labor" (Bowman, 2009, pp.496-497) . However, a crucial limitation of this approach is the lack of the data required to perform the valuation, especially the market value of outputs in the non-profit sector. It is even more difficult to identify which part of this potential output is derived specifically from volunteer work. Thus, even if this method is the most robust, it is not relevant for our assessment.
The input-related method takes into account the market value of the input, that is, the cost of the labor force. Using this second approach, one or other of two specific costs can be calculated, the workers' opportunity cost or the replacement cost for the organization.
The workers' opportunity cost approach assumes that 1 h spent in a volunteer activity can be considered equal to 1 h spent in a paid activity, in other words that volunteer work and paid activity have the same value for the worker. This assumption is debatable for two main reasons (Prouteau and Wolff, 2004) . The first is related to the underlying assumption that the labor market is entirely flexible and that it is feasible to switch from volunteer to paid work without any constraints. This is not the case in the real world. The second problem is related to the comparative value of one unit of time of paid work vis-à-vis one unit of time of volunteer work. The assumption that these values can be considered substitutable is not in fact realistic, because the individual utility functions depending on paid and volunteer activities are not comparable. The utility derived from paid work depends on the salary level and on the time spent doing the work (which is theoretically a source of disutility). For volunteer work, utility and disutility depend on several factors that are difficult to disentangle (output, time, personal beliefs, gratitude of others, etc.). People are usually unable to compare the time they spend in volunteer and paid work, although this is a necessary condition for applying the opportunity cost method.
The primary method used for the monetary valuation of volunteer activity is therefore the replacement cost method (Foster et al, 2001; United Nations, 2003) . With this method, the valuation is based on what an organization would have to pay employees to do the work that they usually benefit from at no cost as a result of volunteer activity. The main weakness of the replacement cost method is that it assumes that paid labor and volunteer labor are one-to-one equivalents in the production process (Bowman, 2009) . If volunteer and paid labor were complementary in the production process, the replacement cost method would be completely invalid for assessing the value of the volunteer effort, whereas the evaluation of the VCR would still be usable (Bowman, 2009) . Several arguments have in fact been advanced to suggest that volunteer and paid labor could be complementary rather than substitutable. These arguments are of two types: the first relates to the risk of bias, the second to differences in productivity.
The Risk of Bias in Biodiversity Monitoring
Volunteers' and paid workers' motivations for participating in biodiversity monitoring may differ. Volunteers may get involved in monitoring activities because they want to contribute to improved protection of biodiversity, while paid staff may be "neutral" experts. Volunteers might thus be suspected of biasing their monitoring data.
This bias is not confirmed by the literature. The quality of the data on biodiversity and the degree of bias are not correlated with data collection by inexperienced observers but with other parameters: (1) the availability of survey design, techniques, and guidelines that can be used by volunteers without lengthy or specialist training (Darwall and Dulvy, 1996; Newman et al., 2003; Foster-Smith and Evans, 2003) ; (2) the need to validate protocols and data sets using standard quantitative methods (Henry et al., 2008; Engel and Voshell, 2002) ; and (3) the ability to coordinate and operate a network that includes different communities of practice (Levrel, 2006; Ohl et al., 2007) . We detail how we have taken these elements into account in the Materials section.
Productivity in Data Collection
Two criticisms of the level of productivity of volunteer work can be advanced: varying levels of skill and training (Handy and Srinivasan, 2004) , and a wide variation in the commitment of volunteers (Brown, 1999) .
Collecting raw data, that is, quantifying the state (quantity, location) of species at a set of monitoring sites, usually requires basic naturalist knowledge. The monitor needs to master species identification, location on a map, counting, and rigorously following a monitoring protocol. It seems reasonable to assume that volunteers can perform these tasks as well as paid professionals This is congruent with the fact that in OECD countries volunteer specialists in species identification, taxonomy, and censusing now vastly outnumber professionals (Schmeller et al., 2009) . We attempt to clarify the productivity issue through the description in the Materials section of the skill level required and the level of responsibility of the volunteers involved in the monitoring schemes. An additional empirical indication that volunteer and paid professional monitoring can be substitutable is that European biodiversity monitoring schemes involve between 83% (average for Germany) and 0% (average for Poland) volunteer effort (Schmeller et al., 2009, p.313) to deliver the same type of information (biodiversity indicators).
We thus conclude that volunteers are not a source of bias in the monitoring of biodiversity and that they are not less productive than paid staff. Consequently, we believe that the replacement cost method can be used to assess the value of volunteer effort in relation to the development of biodiversity indicators.
Materials
As noted above, many states are completely dependent on nationwide monitoring of birds and butterflies to document the EU headline indicators of trends in the abundance and distribution of selected species. In France, the National Museum of Natural History is in charge of the implementation of indicators of common birds (STOC-EPS and STOC-CAPTURE schemes) and butterflies (STERF and OPJ schemes) through the national Vigie-Nature monitoring program (Table 2 ; http://www2.mnhn.fr/vigie-nature/). This program relies on the idea of the "citizen scientist," since those who collect data on biodiversity are all volunteers. It conforms to the three parameters listed above in the Methods section with reference to limiting the risk of bias in biodiversity monitoring schemes (Table 3) .
In order to estimate the replacement costs in our case study, we began by calculating the amount of volunteer labor required to collect the total quantity of biodiversity data for the four Vigie-Nature schemes in 2008 (Table 4) . We then added the amount of time required to convert data into the appropriate electronic format and that required for local coordination. Estimates of fieldwork hours have been provided by the national managers of each scheme, who are the ones best informed for this task: they have developed, tested, and implemented protocols with volunteers. Our estimate method did not take into account the use of personal and public equipment for monitoring species (such as rings, nets, binoculars, and cars), which is provided more or less equally by public organizations and volunteers. We show the detail of volunteer efforts for each monitoring system in Table 4 .
Next, we selected three average per hour salary levels for the monitoring work and added French social security taxes (around 50% of gross salary) where relevant. These valuations were computed based on three sources (Table 5) :
-Valuation A: Fees charged by an environmental consulting organization to supply ecological diagnostics and biodiversity monitoring: that is, how much the state would have to pay for biodiversity monitoring carried out by experts (based on the average of the costs for an expert study supplied by one public organization, one private firm, and one naturalist NGO).
The salary level of staff in charge of environmental monitoring in a French public organization, that is, how much the state would have to pay employees working year-round on biodiversity monitoring (based on the average salary plus social security tax per hour, using the salary scale of a university, a public organization, and a public firm). -Valuation C: The guaranteed French minimum wage, which might represent what naturalists would be willing to be paid for spending their spare time in biodiversity monitoring, given that most young naturalists consider that it is a plus to be paid anything at all for doing what they love to do and that funds are critically low for this activity (based on the official national guaranteed minimum wage plus social security tax).
In addition, three salary levels have been identified corresponding to the level of ability required for the different types of monitoring (Tables 5 and 6 ). The two criteria chosen to define the level of ability were "level of responsibility" (possession of a relevant qualification) and "skill level" (training received in order to be able to carry out the monitoring). These two criteria enable us to clarify the productivity issue raised in the Methods section. The higher the level of ability required for monitoring, the longer the time invested in it, as detailed in the number of person-days per site and visit (Table 7) . Three classes of employee were thus identified for each of the valuations: "no specific skills required," "long training or major responsibility required," "long training and major responsibility required," corresponding respectively to "low expertise," "medium expertise," and "high expertise."
Once the total of hours worked has been determined, we can calculate the total value of volunteer efforts in terms of time and monetary units for each monitoring system (Table 8 ).
Results and Discussion
Our replacement valuation scenarios are summarized in Table 8 . These assessments enable us to estimate what the public investment required to implement two of the most important CBD indicators would be if volunteers were no longer willing to participate in biodiversity monitoring schemes.
Because biodiversity monitoring efforts are mostly concentrated in a short period of time, full-time year-round staffing does not reflect the real rhythm of monitoring work. It is clearly more efficient and feasible to mobilize a large number of specialists during a short period of time. This is why we can claim that the lower and medium valuations (B and C) underestimate the real replacement cost, and that the higher valuation (A) is the most realistic, at least during the first years. In the other two cases, full-time public staffing would still require additional consultant work during the "high season" for monitoring.
An important point to stress is that all these monitoring systems have been developed and operated by national coordinatorsresearchers and engineers who depend on state investment. These researchers and engineers have also contributed to the development of the biodiversity indicators required for the CBD; it is thus important to balance the level of volunteer effort against that of state investment with respect to the coordination of these monitoring systems. In 2007 there were around 10 full-time paid staffers working in the four Vigie-Nature programs, for 16,000 h per year altogether (source: French National Museum of Natural History). Of these, 1200 h were worked by PhD students, 400 by senior scientists, 2000 by junior scientists, 4800 by engineers, 5200 by technicians, 1600 by assistant professors, and 800 by secretarial staff, for total salary costs of around 302,000 euros annually. If we were to add volunteer efforts to that total, operating the VigieNature programs would have required around 41 full-time positions, costing between 980,523 and 4,717,251 euros.
The proportion of volunteers in these schemes is between 69% (678,523 of 980,523 euros) and 93% (4,415,251 of 4,717,251 euros) in monetary terms and around 75% (31 of 41 positions) in full-time staffing equivalencies. If we compare this ratio with the overall ratio calculated for all biodiversity monitoring programs in France (n = 93), we find that the latter are fairly similar, with a ratio of 66.7% volunteers (Schmeller et al., 2009, Table 7 ).
Using the same sources of information, we also compared the level of volunteer effort in the Vigie-Nature programs, in terms of numbers of persons, sites monitored, and site visits, with that of French and European programs overall (Table 7) . We note that the number of person-days and number of sites for the Vigie-Nature schemes seem to be substantially higher than those of French and European biodiversity schemes in general. This is chiefly due to the fact that the Vigie-Nature schemes operate on a nationwide scale, whereas the others listed are a mix of national and local initiatives. If we use a weighted index based on the number of person-days per site and visit (Table 7) and we take into account the different levels of ability required for each scheme (Table 6) , we can see that the efforts required for the Vigie-Nature schemes are more or less equal to those of the others.
It is also possible to compare the Vigie-Nature schemes with other French schemes that use paid staff to implement national CBD indicators. Fishery and forestry monitoring schemes are good Table 6 Method for calculating the costs of a biodiversity monitoring network. In conclusion, we would like to open up the discussion of public investment in biodiversity monitoring programs. It is not usual for private individuals to take responsibility for developing monitoring systems that affect major political issues in a "modern" state. Statefunded and paid monitoring schemes for managing information relevant to major political issues have been in place for a long time. This is true not only for traditional socio-economic questions such as unemployment and GNP growth but also for natural resources with a market value, as noted above with respect to the forest and fishery examples. Today, however, the conservation of biodiversity with no apparent market value has become a major political issue, just like climate change. This development means that the state now has to implement the CBD indicators. Providing an approximate valuation of the volunteer effort required to implement these indicators in France is a first step toward reminding French decision-makers and the national government that volunteers save them a lot of money. These volunteers would be justified in calling on the French government to invest an equivalent amount in this area.
How could such an investment be used to encourage volunteer participation in biodiversity monitoring?
One way to reinvest the money that the French state saves because of volunteer effort would be to give tax rebates to volunteers in monitoring programs, based on the time they spend annually on this activity. These tax rebates already exist in France for cash donations to NGOs. Contributing one's time to NGOs (local coordinators are often NGOs), to state-funded research programs, or simply to nature, ought also to be a source of savings for individuals, not only for the public administrations involved. It would also provide a strong economic incentive to participate in biodiversity monitoring.
Secondly, the state could invest in the operation and coordination of new biodiversity monitoring networks in France. Existing volunteerbased monitoring systems cover only a few taxonomic groups (Schmeller et al., 2009 ). The state should be proactive in biodiversity monitoring, funding studies to gather data on taxa which are not covered by volunteer science (in particular the poorly known invertebrates: Fontaine et al., 2007) . Another important point is that the existing Vigie-Nature monitoring schemes document trends in the abundance and distribution of widespread and relatively common species. These trends are fundamental, in the sense that they characterize the core state of these taxonomic groups. However, the species most likely to become extinct in the short term are very localized ones with small populations, and these species are not well covered by current Vigie-Nature schemes. A complementary set of monitoring schemes could be set up to develop national networks for monitoring these rare species. Often, data have already been collected (cf. LIFE projects, local NGOs), but they may need to be integrated into national quantitative indicators (Henry et al., 2008) , which offer more powerful ways of identifying trends than indicators based on the qualitative evaluation of conservation status (Butchart et al., 2005) . Information on functional biodiversity, based on engineer species or on the functional traits of species, for instance, is also needed in order to develop new functional biodiversity indicators and eventually new ecosystem service indicators (De Groot et al., 2002; Quétier et al., 2007; Díaz et al., 2007) .
Thirdly, the state could invest in countries which have no funds of their own for biodiversity monitoring. "Citizen science" principles are being applied mainly in OECD countries at this point, and are not really in place in most of the developing countries, where the amount of biodiversity and the lack of scientific knowledge are both extensive. Only local monitoring programs exist, often relying on short-term local community involvement (Danielsen et al., 2005) . Public investment by the North ought therefore to support initiatives related to biodiversity monitoring in developing countries, especially training in "citizen science" activities (Danielsen et al., 2009 ). These monitoring systems will need to address information on the interaction between development and conservation issues, if they are to make sense in these poor areas (Levrel and Bouamrane, 2008) . For the sake of efficiency, volunteer monitoring schemes might focus on the collection of basic data during daily activities (Rudd, 2004) such as fishing, hunting, or gathering, for example, especially with respect to invasive species. As noted by J.A. Thomas (2005, p.354) , in a discussion of successful butterfly monitoring in the UK, "It will be possible to repeat these successes in many other nations, as has already been demonstrated in parts of Europe. To be successful, however, it is essential to have a well-funded institutional group to organize data gathering and to collate and analyse the results, as well as a determined leader to establish each scheme at the outset …."
Lastly, the funding could simply be allocated to biodiversity conservation in general and used for any biodiversity conservation project, but especially for supporting small local environmental NGOs, which find it difficult to secure funding for their local monitoring programs.
It is clearly not easy to know which of these options might be the best way to improve biodiversity conservation. Other "compensation" options could be proposed that we have not listed here. A cost-benefit or cost-efficiency analysis for prioritizing them all would be difficult to carry out, since data are lacking and policy priorities in biodiversity monitoring are partly subjective. Serious discussion of both the scientific and political aspects will have to take place to identify the most efficient and informative monitoring systems with a view to investing in them.
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